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Municipal Liability for Exemplary Damages
David H. Hines*
A LTHOUGH TM LAW is not altogether free from doubt ' on the
Xsubject of municipal liability for exemplary damages,2 it is
a settled principle that exemplary damages may not be recovered
against a municipal corporation, 3 nor a state,4 in the absence of
statutory authority.5
Exemplary Damages and Private Corporations
Exemplary damages, whether called punitive damages, vin-
dictive damages, or "smart money," 6 are awarded primarily as
a punishment to the offender and as a deterrent to others. 7 They
also are given for revenge s and are a reason to prosecute a claim
which otherwise would not be worth while.9 They are allowed
over and above that amount which normally will compensate the
injured party,'0 and before they may be allowed some actual
damages must be proved.1 ' Exemplary damages are allowed
* B.S., Northwestern Univ.; President, The Hines Flask Co., Cleveland;
Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-
Wallace College.
1 Raplee v. City of Corning, 6 App. Div. 2d 230, 176 N. Y. S. 2d 162 (1958).
2 Annot., 22 Am. Jur. 2d, sec. 255 (1965).
3 Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965); Clarke v. City of
Greer, 231 S. C. 327, 98 S. E. 2d 751 (1957); Rascoe v. Town of Farmington,
62 N. M. 51, 304 P. 2d 575 (1956); 18 McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corpo-
rations, sec. 53.62 at 286 (3d ed. 1963).
4 McCandless v. State, 6 Misc. 2d 391, 166 N. Y. S. 2d 272 (Ct. of Claims
1956).
5 Michaud v. City of Bangor, 160 Me. 285, 203 A. 2d 687 (1964); Brown v.
Village of Deming, 56 N. M. 302, 243 P. 2d 609 (1952); Desforge v. City of
West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 42 N. W. 2d 633, 19 A. L. R. 2d 898 (1950);
Town of Newton v. Wilson, 128 Miss. 726, 91 So. 419 (1922); Annot., 19 A.
L. R. 2d 903 (1950); 63 C. J. S., 495 (1950).
6 Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property, sec. 269 (rev. ed. 1961).
7 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra note 3; McCormick, Handbook on the Law
of Damages, sec. 77 (1935); Oleck, op. cit. supra note 6.
8 Oleck, op. cit. supra note 6 at sec. 275A; Note, Exemplary Damages in the
Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957).
9 Note, Damages-Right to Exemplary Damages in Fraud and Deceit Ac-
tions, 8 N. Y. L. F. 431 (1962).
10 Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631, 94 A.
L. R. 376 (1933); Pendleton v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 82 W. Va. 270,
95 S. E. 941 (1918).
11 Annot., 19 A. L. R. 2d 903 (1950).
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only where there has been willfulness, fraud, oppression, insult,
gross negligence, 12 or actual malice. Implied malice normally is
not cause enough. 13 These damages are not awarded by right, as
are compensatory damages, 14 but are subject to the discretion
of the jury.15
A corporation can be liable for exemplary damages for the
torts of its employees 16 acting in the course and scope of their
employment.17 Such liability, however, exists only where the
employee himself would be liable to a claim for these damages.' 8
While in some jurisdictions the corporation may be liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior,19 most courts hold that the
corporation must authorize or ratify the wrongful act in order
for the plaintiff to sustain a claim for exemplary damages. 2° It
retains or employs the tortfeasor known to be unfit or incom-
petent,21 or when the employee is its managerial agent a corpo-
ration may be liable for exemplary damages. 22 The corporation
escapes liability for exemplary damages when it has neither
authorized nor ratified an employee's act because there is no
justification for punishing the employer for an act for which the
servant alone is guilty.23 The main purpose in holding the
corporation liable in those cases where it authorizes, ratifies, or
participates in the wrongful act is to punish it, deter others from
doing likewise, and prevent similar conduct in the future.24
12 Oleck, op. cit. supra note 6.
13 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 7 at sec. 79.
14 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra note 3.
15 Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, supra note 10; 38 Am. Jur. 370
(Supp. 1965).
1" 22 Am. Jur. 2d, op. cit. supra note 2.
17 22 Am. Jur. 2d, op. cit. supra note 2 at sec. 257.
18 25 C. J. S. 1156 (1966).
19 Note, Exemplary Damages in Law of Torts, op. cit. supra note 8; Note,
Punitive Damages-Corporation's Liability-Partial Retrial-Wealth of De-
fendant as Evidence, 13 Fordham L. Rev. 255 (1944).
20 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Froelich, 273 F. 2d 92 (D. C. Cir.
1959); Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 13 S. Ct. 261,
37 L. Ed. 97 (1893); McCormick, op. cit. supra note 7 at sec. 80.
21 25 C. J. S. op. cit. supra note 18 at 1154.
22 Oleck, op. cit. supra note 6 at sec. 271.
23 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 7 at sec. 80.
24 Ibid.
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Exemplary Damages and Municipal Corporations
The employees of municipal corporations, in addition to
compensatory damage liability, may be personally liable for
exemplary damages. 2 5
Municipalities are not, under all circumstances, liable in
compensatory damages for the torts of their employees. They are
generally held to have a dual personality, one for governmental
or public functions, and the other for proprietary or private
functions. 26 In performance of its governmental functions, a
municipal corporation enjoys the sovereign immunity of a state.27
When performing a proprietary function, it is liable as a person
or corporation. 2s The municipality's servant must be acting
within the course and scope of his employment, 29 and his act
must be within the powers of the corporate employer .3o In a
series of recent decisions, the Florida courts have abolished the
governmental-proprietary dichotomy and have held the munic-
ipal corporation liable on the basis of respondeat superior
alone.3 1 This is not, however, the prevailing view.3 2 The ques-
tion of exemplary damages arises only in those cases where the
municipality does not have governmental immunity because
liability for exemplary damages will not lie in the absence of
compensatory damages.
Courts have never favored the recovery of exemplary dam-
ages against municipal corporations. 33 A striking example is
given in Costich v. City of Rochester3 4 where the court said,
25 Wrains v. Rose, 175 So. 2d 75 (Fla. App. 1965); Clarke v. City of Greer,
supra note 3; Webber v. Town of Jonesville, 94 S. C. 189, 77 S. E. 857 (1913).
26 Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrine of Municipal Tort
Liability, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942).
27 18 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 3 at sec. 53.04; Blachly and Oatman,
Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob.
181 (1942).
28 Ibid.
29 18 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 3 at sec. 53.65.
30 Ibid.
31 City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965); Hargrove v. Town
of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 60 A. L. R. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1957).
32 See also: Workman v. New York City, Mayor, Alderman and Common-
alty, 179 U. S. 552 (2nd Cir. 1900), 21 S. Ct. 212, 46 L. Ed. 314 (1900) holding
that the governmental and proprietary test as a basis for determining lia-
bility is not controlling in admiralty courts; and Fowler, Admx. v. City of
Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N. E. 72 (1919), overruled by Aldrich v.
City of Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N. E. 164 (1922).
33 Annot., op. cit. supra note 11.
34 68 App. Div. 623, 73 N. Y. Supp. 835, 837 (1902).
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It is not necessary for us to, and we do not, hold that a
municipal corporation could never, under any circumstances,
become responsible for punitive damages, in an action for
trespass or otherwise. But we are prepared to say that the
circumstances which would make it liable for such damages
must be very extraordinary, and almost impossible to con-
ceive of.
And in Ostrom v. City of San Antonio35 the court expressed
similar sentiments when it said,
. . . the case would be exceptional, indeed, when vindictive
or more than compensatory damages can be recoverable
against a municipal corporation.
Early decisions applied to municipal corporations the rules
of exemplary damages applicable to private corporations. Thus,
in Whipple v. Walpole 31 exemplary damages were awarded for
the gross negligence of city officials in maintaining a bridge.
Other cases held that a city would be liable for exemplary dam-
ages only if it refused to repair a street after being informed of its
defective condition.37 Furthermore, the city would be liable only
if it had directed, participated in, or subsequently approved the
misconduct of its employees. 38
In St. Johns Gas Co. v. City of San Juan39 exemplary dam-
ages were given when the Mayor took unlawful possession of
private property. The court held that this was ratification suf-
ficient to hold the city liable.
Though the courts originally applied general principles of
exemplary damages, their reluctance to fit municipal corpora-
tions into that framework soon led legal writers to state that
municipal corporations were not liable for exemplary damages. 40
In 1936 a federal court stated that the liability of municipal cor-
porations should be limited to compensatory damages, 41 and
recent cases have held emphatically that in the absence of statu-
tory authority municipal corporations are not liable for ex-
35 33 Tex. Civ. App. 683, 77 S. W. 829 (1903).
386 10 N. H. 130 (1839), overruled by Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N. H. 387,
6 Am. Rep. 526 (1870).
37 City Council of Montgomery v. Gilmer, 33 Ala. 116, 70 Am. Dec. 562
(1858).
38 Willett v. Village of St. Albans, 69 Vt. 330, 38 A. 72 (1897).
39 1 P. R. Fed. 160 (1902).
40 Annot., 62 Am. Dec. 389 (1854); annot., 59 Am. St. Rep. 589, 602 (1896).
41 Newcastle Products Inc. v. School Dist. of Blair Township, 18 F. Supp.
335 (W. D. Penn. 1936).
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emplary damages. 42 Even where exemplary damages are not
sought or given, but the actual damages are so great that the jury
must have contemplated them, the court will view the award as
including them and will reverse as a matter of law.
43
Two types of cases deserve special comment: Cases involving
willful and malicious acts and cases involving negligent acts and
nuisances. There was an early split of authority on allowing
exemplary damages against municipal corporations for willful or
malicious acts. Although most courts refused liability on the
basis that the acts complained of were not sufficiently malicious
to fall within the rule, they claimed that those acts that were
sufficiently malicious and willful would result in liability.44
However, in McGary v. City of Lafayette,45 where city officials
maliciously and willfully destroyed plaintiff's house, the court
held that the city was not liable for exemplary damages. More
recently a Texas court has said that no issue of exemplary
damages would arise unless there was evidence that the act was
wanton, willful, or malicious. 46 A New York court allowed
treble damages where the wrongful act of city officials was
found willful and deliberate. 47
In ordinary negligence cases it is the common view that
municipal liability should extend to compensatory damages
only.48 49 Generally, courts have held that municipal corpora-
tions are not liable for exemplary damages due to gross neg-
ligence,50 but in City of Miami v. McCorkle 51 where the officers
or employees of a municipality so negligently and carelessly
42 Notes 3 and 5 supra.
43 Weglarz v. City of New York, 12 App. Div. 2d 977, 211 N. Y. S. 2d 664
(1961).
44 City of Decatur v. Fisher, 53 Ill. 407 (1870); Wallace v. City of New
York, 18 How. Pr. 169 (1859); 64 C. J. S. 179, 189 (1950); Annot., 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 512, 764 (1909).
45 12 Rob. La. 674, 43 Am. Dec. 239 (La. 1858).
46 Joseph v. City of Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
47 Macord v. City of New Rochelle, 179 Misc. 311, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 47 (Sup.
Ct. 1942).
48 City of Covington v. Faulhaber, 177 Ky. 623, 197 S. W. 1065 (1917); City
of Chicago v. Langlass, 52 Ill. 256, 4 Am. Rep. 603 (1869).
49 City of Chicago v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241, 95 Am. Dec. 590 (1868); City of
Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kan. 426 (1881); Herfurth v. Corp. of Washington,
6 D. C. 288 (1868); Bennett v. City of Marion, 102 Ia. 425, 71 N. W. 360
(1897).
50 Annot., op. cit. supra note 11.
51 145 Fla. 109, 199 So. 575 (1941).
May, 1966
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1966
MUNICIPAL EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
operated fire fighting equipment as to endanger people on the
streets, the municipality was held liable as an individual. In
nuisance cases exemplary damages generally are denied, 52 but in
one case they were allowed where there was a continuing nui-
sance, on the basis that there was implied malice which justified
exemplary damages.53
Where a statute expressly authorizes recovery of exemplary
damages, no question of the right of recovery arises.64 Since
these statutes are in derogation of the common law, they should
be strictly construed.5 Several South Carolina cases interpret-
ing a statute authorizing exemplary damages against a county
where a lynching occurs say, however, that a broad and liberal
interpretation must be given.5" Statutes authorizing exemplary
damages take a variety of forms.
In Myers v. City and County of San Francisco,57 Plaintiff
recovered under a statute authorizing exemplary damages for
wrongful death. In at least one other state recovery of exem-
plary damages is allowed for ordinary negligence resulting in
death.58 Several statutes permit recovery of double and treble
damages against municipal corporations,59 and a Montana statute
awarding interest from the time of damage was construed to
allow exemplary damages. 60 If the statute is penal in nature, a
municipal corporation is not liable for exemplary damages; but
if the statute is characterized as remedial exemplary damages
will be awarded.6 1 The test of penality is whether redress is of a
public wrong or a private wrong6 2
52 City of Covington v. Faulhaber, 178 Ky. 526, 199 S. W. 32 (1917).
53 Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S. W. 2d 41 (1935).
54 Annot., op. cit. supra note 11.
55 18 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 3, sec. 53.65 at 295.
56 Earle v. Greenville County, 215 S. C. 539, 56 S. E. 2d 348 (1949); Green
v. Greenville County, 176 S. C. 433, 180 S. E. 471 (1935); Kirkland v. Allen-
dale County, 128 S. C. 541, 123 S. E. 648 (1924); see also Adams v. City of
Salina, 58 Kan. 246, 48 P. 918 (1897) where exemplary damages were not
allowed in a case of lynching.
57 42 Cal. 215 (1871).
58 Coffee County v. Parrish, 249 Ala. 226, 30 So. 2d 578 (1947).
59 Michaud v. City of Bangor, supra note 5; McManus v. City of Madison
Heights, 366 Mich. 26, 113 N. W. 2d 889 (1962); Desforge v. City of West St.
Paul, supra note 5.
60 Wright v. City of Butte, 64 Mont. 362, 210 P. 78 (1922).
61 Michaud v. City of Bangor, supra note 5.
62 Ibid.
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Conclusion
Courts offer many reasons for exempting municipal cor-
porations from liability for exemplary damages. These reasons
can be classified as: Those concerning taxpayers; those concerning
municipal employees; those concerning public funds, and those
concerning the municipal function.
The burden of any judgment against a municipality even-
tually must fall on its taxpayers.6 3 It is argued that since exem-
plary damages are awarded to punish the guilty party, allowing
them against a municipality would be penalizing taxpayers who
had no part in the wrong. 4 Another reason often advanced is
that the people (taxpayers) to be punished by these damages
are those who are to benefit from the example the damages
should set.6 5 A third argument is that the taxpayers should not
be punished because they have little to say about municipal
management 66 by a city government not always of their choice. 67
All of these arguments overlook one very important fact, which
is that the municipal corporation is a legal entity, 8 as is a
private corporation. The taxpayers bear the same relation to
the municipal corporation as stockholders do to a private cor-
poration. This legal entity, not the taxpayers, is to be punished;
and this punishment is to set the example for other municipal
corporations.
The next class of arguments concerns the employment
relations of the municipal corporations. It is reasoned that it is
unjust to punish a municipal corporation for the torts of its
employees because the municipality exercises less dominion and
control over its employees than does a private corporation.69
Another argument claims that the deterrent element against
municipal corporations is ineffective because it is assumed that
the city officials will discipline the wrongdoing employee any-
way,"' whereas another argument claims that it is ineffective be-
cause the city officials will not discipline the employee because
63 City of Lawton v. Johnstone, 123 Okla. 145, 252 P. 393 (1926).
64 Brown v. Village of Deming, supra note 5.
65 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra note 3; annot., op. cit. supra note 11.
66 Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931).
67 Costich v. City of Rochester, supra note 34.
68 37 Am. Jur. 618 (1941).
69 Costich v. City of Rochester, supra note 34.
70 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra note 3.
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of political reasons.7 1 All employers, whether they be individ-
uals, private corporations, or municipal corporations are respon-
sible for the activities of their employees in pursuance of their
master's business, under respondeat superior. Were these valid
arguments, they would apply to compensatory damages as to
exemplary damages. This reasoning also ignores the concept
that in order to be liable for exemplary damages, the principal
must approve or ratify the wrongful act. Another argument is
that an award of exemplary damages against a municipality
would not deter other employees from wrongdoing. 72 But these
damages are designed to influence the conduct of employees, not
that of other municipal corporations. The employees are per-
sonally liable for exemplary damages.
Another class of arguments concerns the public coffers. It is
said that since evidence of the wealth of an individual is admis-
sible as evidence in determining exemplary damages, evidence of
the unlimited taxing power of the municipality would increase
the damage award to infinity.73 It is also stated that the allow-
ance of exemplary damages would place an unbearable burden
on small municipalities 74 and that it would impoverish the public
treasuries without serving the admonitory function.7 5 Statistics
show that these fears are more theoretical than real.7 6 Actually,
the tort burden is smaller per capita in the smaller municipalities
than it is in the larger cities.7T And to consider the unlimited
taxing power of a municipal corporation in fixing exemplary
damages is as foolish as considering all the avenues of financing
available to a private corporation.
The final class of arguments concerns the status of a mu-
nicipal corporation in its public role. It is argued that because
a municipality is a public corporation organized for political
purposes, it should not be treated as a private corporation organ-
ized for profit.7 8 It is claimed that any wrongful act by a
71 Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, op. cit. supra note 66.
72 Fisher v. City of Miami, supra note 3.
73 Ibid.
74 Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 363 (1942).
75 Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, op. cit. supra note 66.
76 Warp, op. cit. supra note 74.
77 Ibid.
78 Costich v. City of Rochester, supra note 34; Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65
Mo. 620, 27 Am. Rep. 299 (1877); 38 Am. Jur. 370 (1941).
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municipal employee is ultra vires and incapable of ratification
by the municipality,79 and that a municipality cannot be liable
for a willful and malicious wrong. 0
Experience has shown, however, that the latter is largely a
theory, and not always a fact.8 '
Any statement that a municipal corporation cannot authorize or
ratify the acts of its agents is a fiction.
After all the arguments against holding municipal corpora-
tions liable for exemplary damages have been analyzed, it ap-
pears that none of them are very persuasive. The same prin-
ciples that allow the recovery of exemplary damages against
private corporations should be applied to municipal corpora-
tions s 2
. . . tort liability should be imposed upon the city just as
upon a private corporation .... 83
These damages will set an example to all other municipal
corporations. They will serve as a warning to them that unless
they supervise their employee's activities closely, they may be
liable for more than compensatory damages.
. . . it is mainly by means of fearless and independent juries
awarding exemplary damages, that the rights of the citizens
can be adequately protected, and violence and outrage sup-
pressed.84
79 McDonald v. Butler, 10 Ga. App. 845, 74 S. E. 573 (1912); Hunt v. City
of Boonville, supra note 78.
80 City of Parsons v. Lindsay, supra note 49; Chicago v. Kelly, 69 Ill. 475
(1873).
81 Doyle v. City of Sandpoint, 18 Ida. 654, 112 P. 204, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.), 34
(1910).
82 City of Miami v. McCorkle, supra note 51.
83 Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 Calif.
L. Rev. 461, 484 (1922).
84 McGary v. City of Lafayette, supra note 45.
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